FSF Motives in the Cisco Case

One of the comments I received to a recent post questions the motives of the Free Software Foundation ("FSF") in its complaint against Cisco, and whether the FSF is overreaching in the remedies it proposes. Specifically, the comments reference The Software Lawyer blog posting entitled Free Software Foundation Sues Cisco: Some Criticism. To summarize, the blog post questions whether the FSF would accept GPL compliance as a solution to the disagreement with Cisco and goes further to say that "[the FSF] wants to push Cisco around and it wants money."

I think these views are overly cynical of the FSF's motives. I also disagree that endorsing the FSF's actions results in granting a licensor power to choose substitute license terms. Below, I discuss my reasoning for these conclusions in more detail in hopes of illuminating the issues in the broader discussion around the meaning of license compliance and the role of license enforcement in the open source world. Please also note that I am not concluding that the FSF will be successful in its litigation either through a judgement on the merits of the case or a favorable settlement. Instead, my intent is to illustrate that the FSF's actions appear reasonable.

[Note: I have no knowledge of the FSF's or Cisco's thoughts, reasoning or internal discussions on these matters - all of my comments are based on the complaint and public statements by these entities and commentators.)]

FSF Motives

The views presented in the comments and blog post suggest that the FSF motives are pointed more towards self interest than support of the goals of the free software movement. To the contrary, the FSF's actions indicate that it is legitimately trying to enforce the principles of free software by ensuring that Cisco honors the freedom of its users to have access to source code. No doubt the FSF would like to make an example out of Cisco and would like to see onerous penalties (including monetary damages) imposed for failure to comply as a means of discouraging other potential infringers, but this is consistent with enforcing the principles of software freedom.

The commentary also cites the FSF's requirement that Cisco appoint an open source officer as a potential remedy outside the scope of the complaint. While this might seem unusual, it is consistent with a common litigation strategy in which plaintiffs ask for more than they might be entitled to from a court. This tactic helps push settlement discussions and alternatives to litigation remedies. In fact, FSF is not the first to use this approach. Similar terms have been agreed upon in the string of Busybox cases, which were also litigated by the Software Freedom Law Center. These actions indicate a good litigation strategy rather than impure motives or overreaching.

Motives of a Large Company as an Alleged Infringer

The commentary also assumes that large companies in Cisco's position, would necessarily do their best to comply with license terms as fast as possible, and that such a company would not continue shipping an allegedly infringing product unless absolutely certain of ability to comply. In turn, the commentary suggests that this indicates the FSF has unreasonably deemed Cisco's proposed compliance activities as inadequate. This conclusion is not supported in my view.

It is fair to assume that a company in Cisco's position would perform a risk analysis based on the FSF's stated concerns and could reasonably decide to respond by engaging FSF directly. This strategy would permit the company to work through compliance options over an extended time period. From a purely utilitarian standpoint, this approach seems more favorable than immediately pulling a product suspected of GPL infringement without first consulting the FSF, which would result in further difficulties. No doubt in the multiple years of discussion between Cisco and the FSF, both parties understood that some sort of compliance actions were appropriate, but they had differing interpretations on the types of remedies and time frames for resolution. As a result, it appears that the FSF likely has a reasonable basis for its conclusion that Cisco was not acting fast enough and the use of litigation was a way to stress the importance of compliance is justified.

Remaking the Rules

The claims that FSF's proposed remedies are "remaking the rules" and that it "gets to choose the terms of reinstatement" also are not warranted. The GPL and LGPL licenses immediately terminate once a licensee violates their conditions. Once termination occurs, a licensor can choose to enforce an infringement claim and use the threat of damages awarded by a court as leverage to negotiate a settlement that includes more than monetary damages. This is the approach the FSF is taking with Cisco and it seems consistent with good litigation strategy.

In fact, the FSF has also chosen to work with Cisco for several years to obtain compliance without litigation, which further indicates the reasonableness of its actions. The FSF's proposed remedies are separate and distinct from the rights available to Cisco and all other potential licensee under the GPL. The FSF could not remake the rules of litigation remedies even it wanted and it doesn't seem fair to conclude that the FSF is trying to remake the rules or make up substitute license terms.

In short, whether the FSF will be successful in reaching a favorable judgment on the matters in the complaint or obtaining a favorable settlement with Cisco remains to be seen. Even so, the FSF's motives and actions seem reasonable in the context of the allegations in the complaint.